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Abstract: The widespread use of the Internet comes accompanied with severe threats for web applications 
security. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been considered to deal with the diversity and complexity 
of web attacks. In this context, this work proposes an algorithm for web attack detection, exploring an 
anomaly-based technique: the wavelet transform. The proposed algorithm analyzes anomalies within 
variations on characters frequencies in web requests. Experimental results show high rates of detection 
without false positive occurrences.
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Introduction
Internet has become an interconnection 
system between computer networks and web 
applications, that serves billions of users and 
mainly provides communication and informa-
tion dissemination.
A consequence of massive usage and ex-
pansion of web applications is the continual 
identification and appearance of new vulner-
abilities (OWASP, 2010), that are explored with 
the aim of violating the security and prejudic-
ing the availability of applications (Fonseca et 
al., 2010).
In this context, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) are necessary to guarantee information 
security. These systems can be distinguished 
according to two different approaches: signa-
ture- and anomaly-based. 
Signature-based IDS identify attacks 
through a group of information containing 
previously defined patterns, i.e. signatures. 
(Kruegel et al., 2004). The advantage of this 
approach is to detect attacks with low rate of 
false positives. Nevertheless, only attacks with 
respect to known patterns are identified, de-
manding frequent signature updates in order 
to keep detection in reliable standards.
Alternatively, anomaly-based IDS identify 
attacks through the observation of behaviour 
variations in characteristics of the network 
(Chandola et al., 2009). The main advantage of 
this approach is the ability to identify new at-
tacks that are not necessarily associated to pre-
viously known patterns, avoiding the usage of 
signatures (Chandola et al., 2009). 
Web attacks are performed exploring many 
different contexts. Among them, attacks that 
manipulate web requests have received wide 
attention (OWASP, 2010) in the last years. 
These attacks explore vulnerabilities of pa-
rameter manipulations to change values of a 
web request (Álvares and Petrović, 2003). In 
this context, special characters are commonly 
inserted, resulting in serious degradation of 
integrity, authentication, availability and au-
thorization of internet services.
Several works explore anomaly-based 
methodologies to determine anomalies re-
strained in the web traffic (Kruegel and Vigna, 
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2003; Wang and Stolfo, 2004; Estevez-Tapiador 
et al., 2005), to mention a few examples. The 
most widespread techniques are those based 
on n-grams (Wang and Stolfo, 2004), determin-
istic finite automata (Ingham and Inoue, 2007), 
statistics information (Kruegel and Vigna, 
2003) and Markov chains (Estevez-Tapiador et 
al., 2005). 
Signal processing techniques have been 
recently applied to anomalies detection in 
computer networks (de Azevedo et al., 2011; 
Lu and Ghorbani, 2009), providing a promis-
ing toolset, with big potential for anomalies 
recognition.
This work explores a new approach for web 
attacks detection also based on signal process-
ing techniques, considering well-established 
wavelets methods (Stollnitz et al., 1995). In the 
initial study, presented in Cappo et al. (2009), 
the usage of the Haar wavelet transform for at-
tack detection on web application was investi-
gated. Now in this work the application of the 
same discrete wavelet transform is considered 
to analyze the characters frequency distribu-
tion of web requests. The wavelet transform 
enables the extraction of information on dif-
ferent resolution levels and discards the train-
ing phase. This is an alternative to techniques 
based on machine learning (Kruegel and 
Vigna, 2003; Kiani et al., 2008), which are the 
most used approach to detect web attacks.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II briefly summarizes the most commonly 
techniques used to detect anomalies on web re-
quests. Section III presents aspects with respect 
to web attacks. In Section IV the one dimen-
sional Haar wavelet transform is introduced, 
along with the corresponding bi-dimensional 
version. Section V contains the approach for 
detecting web attacks using the Haar wavelet 
transform. The validation set of experiments is 
presented in Section VI. Finally, the conclusion 
of the work is presented in Section VII.
Ano maly-based Detection 
Techniques for Web Traffic
In this section a brief review about anomalies 
detection in the context of web traffic security 
is presented. The most common techniques are 
based on machine learning approaches, which 
explore anomalies in web traffic by a training 
phase, to model the ordinary behaviour of a 
system (Kruegel et al., 2004). Three commonly 
used approaches for the learning phase from 
web requests: packet payload, extracted tokens 
and character distribution analysis.
Wang and Stolfo (2004) observed packet 
payload to model byte (n-gram) frequency 
distributions. A clustering algorithm was then 
applied to merge similar distributions by port 
and stream directions. The detection phase 
consisted in comparing the cluster distances to 
a certain threshold. 
Ingham and Inoue (2007) tokenized HTTP 
requests. They employed Deterministic Finite 
Automata (DFA) machine induction com-
bined with rules and heuristics for modelling 
and detecting attacks on traces of tokens with 
benign attacks. Ingham and Inoue (2007) com-
pared the DFA and n-grams performances, 
signalling that the first approach was more ef-
ficient than the former one.
Character distribution was also explored 
by the usage of statistic techniques. Kruegel 
and Vigna (2003) modelled the relative fre-
quency of the characters and arranged into 
six arbitrarily chosen groups. Finally the Pear-
son’s chi-squared statistical test was applied to 
detect attacks. Kiani et al. (2008) also utilized 
the test. However, in their work cumulative 
frequency of the characters in the training 
phase has been considered, and the characters 
from Yate’s correction method were grouped. 
Another group clustering was proposed by 
Sriraghavan and Lucchese (2008), where three 
groups of characters were formed according to 
type as alphabetic, numeric, and special char-
acters.
Another behaviour modelling was pro-
posed by Corona et al. (2009). The authors, 
using Markov’s hidden models for parameter 
analysis of the web traffic communication 
(GET and POST), demonstrated good results 
in the detection of the SQL Injection and Cross 
Site-scripting (XSS) attacks. Markov’s hidden 
models were also employed by Airu and Gi-
acinto (2010) to explore the HTTP payload 
byte sequence for analysing attacks between 
web application and the web server.
Fr om the authors’ knowledge, signal 
processing techniques have been applied for 
detecting network anomalies, but not to ex-
plore HTTP requests, as proposed in this work.
Web Attacks
Within the reported attacks in the last 
years, a representative amount was related to 
web applications (OWASP, 2010). This scenar-
io is a consequence from the increasing utiliza-
tion of these systems on the web and also from 
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failures on the software development phase, 
since programmers commonly skip some se-
curity issues on the software life cycle design 
(Wagner et al., 2011).
From OWASP (2010), vulnerabilities re-
lated to content injections are on the top of 
the technical vulnerabilities list. The amount 
of injection based web attacks, as Code Injec-
tion and Cross Site-scripting (XSS), are conse-
quently increasing and causing damages for 
many organizations.
This work looks at web attacks that insert 
malicious content by changing the character 
frequency on web requests. Figure 1 shows an 
example of this type of attack, where charac-
ters “.” and “/” were injected on a GET request.
Wav elet Transform
The wavelet transform decomposes a signal 
on many resolution levels with the goal to high-
light and recognize relevant information on the 
signal. The wavelet decomposition is hierarchi-
cal and is formed by a coarsest level of repre-
sentation and many refinement levels of infor-
mation (Stollnitz et al., 1995). The coarsest level 
is associated to the scaling coefficients, which 
represent the main trend of the signal. The re-
finement levels are composed by the wavelet 
coefficients, also called details, which are com-
plementary information of the coarse represen-
tation and are needed to reconstruct the origi-
nal data. In signal analysis applications they are 
manipulated in order to allow noise removal, 
compression (Kozakevicius et al., 2005), or other 
feature extractions from the analyzed data.
There is a diversity of wavelet families, and 
the Haar wavelet is the one adopted in this work, 
mainly due to the facility to preserve the loca-
tion of sudden variations within data (Mallat, 
2008). Furthermore, the Haar wavelet transform 
dismisses special treatment for the signal bor-
ders and its implementation is straightforward. 
These are important features when considering 
discrete input data (with finite dimension).
One-dimensional Wavelet
The application of the Haar wavelet trans-
form involves high-pass (H) and low-pass fil-
ters (L), which are convolved with the signal 
to obtain the transformation coefficients. The 
application for one decomposition level of the 
pyramidal algorithm (Mallat, 2008), provides 
two groups of coefficients: a set of scaling,
cj –1,i , and a set of wavelets coefficients, dj –1,i . 
The coefficients cj –1,i are associated to lower 
frequencies, keeping the mean information of 
the signal at each level. The wavelets coeffi-
cients (or details) dj –1,i are associated to higher 
frequencies within the signal. Their computa-
tion considered as input data a vector with 
values on the finest resolution level. Therefore 
the one scale decomposition is done as follow:
     (1)
    (2)
Note that the difference between them is 
basically due to the considered filter type. 
One of the most important properties of the 
wavelet transform is its capability to identify 
jumps and peaks on data through the set of 
details (Grané and Veiga, 2009). This prop-
erty allows the application of wavelet trans-
form for abrupt changes identification and 
localization, noise removal and signal com-
pression. In this paper we explore the algo-
rithms presented in Stollnitz et al. (1995) for 
the alarm designing.
In Figure 2, an algorithm to compute the 
one dimensional wavelet transform (1DWT) 
is represented. In the input procedure the 
input data is processed until the coarsest de-
composition level is achieved (line 8). On the 
level decomposition step (line 1), only data 
associated to mean values in each level is de-
composed, generating a new set of means (de-
noted by C’[i] on Figure 2) and a new set of 
details (denoted by C’       + i
h
2
), both with half 
size of the original block. One aspect to ob-
serve is that only blocks associated to means 
(scaling coefficients) are further decomposed 
when the standard wavelet transform is con-
Figure 1. Example of web attack with malicious code injection.
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sidered. Another aspect is that in the proposed 
algorithm all decompositions are stored on the 
same array C, instead of using two different 
arrays as suggested by pyramidal algorithm 
equations. The level of transform corresponds 
to the number of interactions on decomposi-
tion procedure. Each level of Haar wavelet 
transform is performed here in a dyadic form, 
i.e. the input data is always split in sets with 
half size. At least two values must be kept on 
the coarsest level to run this algorithm.
Bi-dimensional Wavelet
The bi-dimensional wavelet transform 
(2DWT) allows data analysis and identification 
of variations with respect to lines and columns 
of two dimensional input data.
The bi-dimensional wavelet transform 
(2DWT) allows data analysis and their varia-
tions recognition with respect to lines and col-
umns of a bi-dimensional input data. In fact, 
when processing the decomposition with re-
spect to lines and to columns, another set of 
variations is captured as a by-product, which 
here we interpret as being in the diagonal di-
rection. This set is also a linear combination to 
lines and columns and is associated again to 
high frequencies of the signal. In other words 
the 2DWT generates three sets of wavelet co-
efficients (sometimes called as sub-bands) for 
representing variations in the input data, dif-
ferently of the 1DWT, which generates only 
one set of wavelet coefficients.
In practice, there are many ways to per-
form this transformation (Stollnitz et al., 1995), 
since the order which the many 1DWT are 
performed implies in a different system for 
data representation. One simple form is to 
compute initially the 1DWT for all lines of the 
input matrix and then compute the 1DWT for 
all columns of the resulting matrix. According 
to the classification presented in Stollnitz et 
al. (1995) this is a Non-Standard formulation, 
which is presented in Figure 3.
In Figure 4 the effect of applying one com-
plete level of the 2DWT is presented for one 
sample image. First in panel (a) the interme-
diate stage after the 1DWT by lines is shown, 
where data is decomposed in scaling and 
wavelet coefficients. In panel (b) the final step 
is shown, when all three sets of wavelet coef-
ficients are finally obtained as well as the set 
of the scaling coefficients (one level coarser). 
As done for the one dimensional transform, 
again in a free interpretation, the scaling coef-
ficients are seen as a block formed by means, 
(means over means), and the three wavelet co-
efficient sub-bands could be viewed as details 
of means (dc), means of details (cd) and details 
of details (dd), as a try to identify the origin of 
the wavelet coefficient generated during the 
transformation process.
In the application proposed here in this 
paper the lines of input matrix are associ-
ated to ASCII characters and web requests to 
the columns. This paper explores the 2WDT 
to accomplish analysis of the character fre-
quencies variation kept in the web requests in 
more than one direction, within a request and 
among requests.
 In order to perform more levels of the 
2DWT, only the set of the scaling coefficients 
is analyzed, being considered as the new in-
Figure 2. Algorithm for 1DWT decomposition (Adapted from Stollnitz et al., 1995).
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put data, which will again be decomposed in 
four new coefficient sets (sub-bands) accord-
ing to the same algorithm. In each stage of the 
transform, the wavelets sub-bands remain un-
altered.
Threshold
Af ter the application of the bi-dimensional 
wavelet transform, the signal is represented by 
four different sub-bands cc, cd, dc and dd. The 
sub-bands associated to wavelet coefficients 
represent the data variations captured in three 
different directions.
According to one of the main properties of 
wavelet decompositions, each time the wave-
let coefficients are small, the corresponding 
coarse information (mean coefficients) can ac-
curately represent the original data. Therefore 
the determination of the size (significance) of 
the wavelet coefficients is a tool to discard ir-
relevant data from the representation or to 
detect relevant variations within the analyzed 
data. Thus, the criteria to discard wavelet coef-
ficients are basically based on comparing the 
coefficients from sub-bands cd, dc and dd with 
some reference value, called threshold value. 
One of the most utilized values in filtering 
Figure 3. Nonstandard 2DWT algorithm: 1DWT applied for all lines and then applied for all columns 
(Adapted from Stollnitz et al., 1995).
Figure 4. NonStandard decomposition of an image (Adapted from Stollnitz et al., 1995).
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applications is the universal threshold pro-
posed by Donoho and Iain (1995) that is de-
termined by λ = σ   2 log(N), where σ is the 
standard deviation of the coefficients, N is the 
number of samples at each sub-band.
When the threshold value is consistently 
chosen, the threshold operation does not de-
stroy fundamental properties of the signal 
(Donoho and Iain, 1995). So, the main analysis 
question is how to determine the most coher-
ent threshold, capable to separate relevant and 
irrelevant information, depending on the ap-
plication properties. 
Donoho and Iain (1995) proposed two ways 
to filter wavelet coefficients: one by applying 
a Hard threshold (Equation 3) and the other 
by applying a Soft threshold (Equation 4). The 
Hard threshold discards wavelet coefficients 
without modifying coefficients bigger than the 
threshold value (those judged as significant) 
and the Soft threshold provides smoothness 
the entire set of wavelet coefficients.
                    (3)
 (4)
In this work, the Hard threshold is em-
ployed, since the main information necessary 
for modelling the proposed attack algorithm 
detection is the significance of the wavelet co-
efficient instead of its absolute value.
For a detailed explanation about different 
threshold definitions, as well as different crite-
ria for the threshold value choice, see (Donoho 
and Iain, 1995).
Wave let based Algorithm for Web 
Attacks Detection
Anomalies can occur in web traffic com-
munications, especially during a web attack 
occurrence, causing several inconveniences 
for clients and web servers. The web traf-
fic can be analyzed on different ways, from 
packet amount to protocols usage or server 
requests, considering point-to-point streams 
or not. This work focuses on web attacks that 
generate anomalies in the web request charac-
ter distribution, observed from the server side 
(requests from clients to server).
Attack-free web requests present two im-
portant features (Kruegel and Vigna, 2003) 
they have a regular structure with respect to 
characters frequency distribution and they 
commonly use readable characters. Thus, 
variations on the regular structure of the com-
monly used characters can indicate undesir-
able events, such as a possible attack. Since 
wavelet analysis is an efficient tool to detect 
variations, this capability is explored here for 
detecting web attacks that inject code or mali-
cious content in web requests. The proposed 
wavelet-based algorithm analyzes the request 
characters frequency by using the two dimen-
sional Haar wavelet transform.
The proposed algorithm has two data in-
puts: the requests sent to a specific web server 
and a constant correction factor ρ to adjust the 
universal threshold value. The requests are or-
ganized in a matrix defined by M[n][m], where 
n is the number of ASCII characters (256). The 
value of m is the amount of requests that are 
considered in the wavelet analysis. In the ma-
trix, each row represents a character and each 
column represents a request. Thus, the ele-
ment M[i][j] contains the amount of times the 
ith ASCII character appears in request j.
Figure 5 presents the proposed algorithm. 
For the anomalies detection approach in this 
work, only one level of the 2DWT is performed, 
since the significant abrupt changes are associ-
ated to high frequencies wavelet coefficients. 
Through the transformation of M[n][m], four 
sub-bands of coefficients are obtained: cc, dc, 
cd and dd. For each one of the wavelets sub-
bands, a corresponding threshold value (λdc, 
λcd and λdd) is computed as the multiplication 
of the constant correction factor ρ and the uni-
versal threshold value for the sub-band. This 
correction of the universal threshold value 
provides more freedom in adjusting the trun-
cation parameter in the filtering process since 
the Donoho threshold was planned consider-
ing image denoising and this paper threshold 
must be applied to highlight only the values 
that override the higher value of a data with-
out attacks. The threshold strategy is then 
processed (Line 4-6).
After the hard threshold application, char-
acters with the most significant variations for 
their occurrence distribution can be identi-
fied. Note that the wavelet-based algorithm 
enables peaks verification on the occurrence 
distributions among characters on the same 
requisition (M[n][m] rows) and among char-
acters of different requests (M[n][m] columns). 
To decide whether the variation is an anomaly 
or not (Line 9 of the algorithm), the variation 
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detection between each two pairs of sub-bands 
cd, dc and dd is analysed. A peak on a charac-
ter distribution is associated to a peak on the 
corresponding wavelet coefficient. Therefore, 
anomalous events are associated to significant 
coefficients, classified after the hard threshold 
process. Moreover, according to the proposed 
heuristic, anomaly on a characters distribution 
should be captured by at least two sub-bands 
of details to be considered an attack (Line 6).
Finally, another point to be highlighted is 
that the Haar wavelet transform is character-
ized as a simple and fast tool, specially because 
it’s algorithmic formulation (Mallat, 2008). In 
practice, it is due to the number of operations 
being linearly proportional to the quantity of 
data contained in the input matrix, resulting in 
an algorithm of complexity O(nm).
Experiments and Results
Data  collected from web application on the 
web server of the Polytechnic of the National 
University of Asuncion (FPUNA), Paraguay is 
considered to validate the proposed methodol-
ogy. The data acquisition period was from Jan-
uary to March 2009, building 71 days of web 
traffic, captured from log files of web server. 
Altogether, a total amount of 59.248 web re-
quests on the collecting phase was obtained.
For the validation process of any anomaly 
detection procedure, the capability of detect-
ing true attacks has to be proved. Therefore, a 
data set with attacks inserted in known posi-
tions is considered for this verification. 
The attacks detected on the FPUNA collect-
ed data set were manually removed by visual 
inspection, generating a so called “attack-free” 
signal, whose status was verified by using ac-
tualized signature-based IDS. Eight test data 
sets were built by the injection of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 10 and 20 attacks in predefined places in 
the “attack-free” constructed signal. The data 
set with 0 attacks presents regularity among 
requests and low variability within the same 
character frequency by request. According to 
the description given on Section 3, the injected 
attacks were of types: directory transversal, 
cross site scripting and buffer overflow (the 
most popular attacks against web servers). 
Based on the eight benchmark examples, 
the detection rates were computed, since the 
attacks location and distributions are previ-
ously known. For the experiments executed 
in this work, all event detections on unknown 
places are considered false positives. In other 
words, a false positive is characterized by the 
detection of an attack in a normal web request.
Table 1 presents the results of the detection 
when varying the number of attacks and the 
constant factor of universal threshold value. 
The algorithm was run considering the Hard 
Figure 5. Pseudocode of algorithm proposed.
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threshold approach and increasing the value 
of the threshold by multiplying it by factor ρ 
equal to 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The results show that 
for all data sets the number of false positives 
(FP) is very high when constant factor is 1 and 
2 times the universal threshold λ. Otherwise, 
when the threshold overrides 3λ the number 
of false positives is small. The number is 
0 when the adopted threshold is equal to 5λ.
It is important to notice that the determi-
nation of the threshold value is a key point 
in analysis using wavelet transforms associ-
ated to the Hard or Soft threshold strategies. 
Here the universal threshold value given by 
Donoho and Iain (1995) was considered as 
a possible reference choice for the cutting 
point, since it was an efficient choice for de-
noising processes when the signal is affected 
by White Gaussian noise. In other words, the 
Hard threshold with the universal thresh-
old value is designed to be efficient under a 
big amount of variability. Thus, the experi-
ment designed here shows that the universal 
threshold value is only one possible candidate 
to be considered as an alarm detector, and the 
correction factor plays an important role in 
fitting the cutting parameter according to the 
magnitude of the analyzed data, especially 
in the case of noise absence. Here five times 
the universal truncation value produced an 
efficient detector, since all the attacks were 
detected without occurrence of false posi-
tives. However, according to the web applica-
tion, an analysis for the determination of the 
threshold value has to be performed. In this 
paper the FPUNA dataset was collected from 
a web application server and it has low vari-
ability and regularity between requests and 
characters frequencies.
The Table 2 compares our algorithm results 
with the results obtained by the Pearson chi-
squared statistical χ2 test. The χ2 test is fre-
quently used by detection techniques (Kruegel 
and Vigna, 2003; Kiani et al., 2008) with the 
same proposal as presented in this work.
The χ2 test makes use of a training phase 
and it was set to use a threshold of 10% higher 
than the maximum value obtained on the train-
ing phase. In the comparison, our algorithm 
has utilized the threshold of 5λ. The results ob-
tained comparing of the proposed algorithm 
with the χ2 show the wavelet-based algorithm 
has better results with respect to the number 
of false positives and correct detections.
For the measure the computational cost 
are performed various performance tests. The 
algorithm was implemented with ANSI C in 
a sequential version (i.e. using a single proc-
essor). The version of the Wavelet Transform 
algorithm is not in-line requiring an additional 
space of order of O(nm). In the experiments the 
total memory required for the algorithm was 
approximately 640 KB. 
The analysed dataset contains about 232 
groups of 256 requests. The processing average 
time of 256 requests is presented for three dif-
ferent platforms in the Table 3. This processing 
time of complete dataset (FPUNA), with 59248 
requests, considering the platforms presented 
was 1 second, 1.5 seconds and 2.5 seconds, 
respectively. Thus, the obtained performance 
in requests per second was approximately be-
tween 59000 and 24000 requests per second.
Conclusio n
Internet became an essential component 
for the current society and numerous organi-
Table 1. Results obtained with proposed approach.
# attacks detected with differents ρλ
Attacks
1λ 2λ 3λ 4λ 5λ
FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP
0 15971 0 1939 0 7 0 1 0 0 0
1 15970 1 1934 1 8 1 2 1 0 1
2 15969 2 1934 2 7 2 1 2 0 2
3 15911 3 1934 3 7 2 1 3 0 3
4 15909 4 1934 4 7 4 1 4 0 4
5 15887 5 1874 5 3 5 1 5 0 5
10 15774 10 1940 10 7 10 1 10 0 10
20 15420 20 1876 20 3 20 1 20 0 20
FP = False Positive TP = True Positive
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zations perform daily operations through web 
applications. However, security of the infor-
mation plugged in the web, dependability and 
reliability of the users should be guaranteed. 
Attacks damaging web applications or ac-
cessing restricted information can cause sev-
eral problems for an organization and, conse-
quently, for its users.
This paper proposed a new approach to 
detect web attacks by using signal-processing 
techniques. The performed experiments have 
demonstrated that the utilization of the wave-
let transform associated to a threshold criteria 
allows web attack detection, since attacks as-
sociated of characters injection cause signifi-
cant variation in the characters distribution 
within the requests.
Moreover, the issue related to the choice of 
the threshold value is also addressed. The rate 
of false positives was null when the correction 
factor ρ  was considered bigger than 5, gener-
ating a threshold value 5 times the universal 
value of Donoho and Iain (1995). The Hard 
threshold procedure was applied for construc-
tion of the proposed alarm detector.
Using the properties of the wavelet trans-
form it was possible to analyze the variation 
in the characters distribution in different di-
Table 2. Comparison of algorithm proposed with test Person χ2
# attacks inserted in the data set FPUNA
Algorithm
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 20
FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP FP TP
χ2 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 3 12 4 12 5 12 10 12 20
* 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 10 0 20
* Algorithm proposed (5λ) FP = False Positive TP = True Positive
Table 3. The computational cost for processing of the algorithm proposed.
Plataform Average time in ms*
Intel Pentium 4 3.0 GHz
Fedora – Linux
Kernel 2.6 - gcc 4.3.0
3.225207
Intel Core 2 Duo 2.0 GHz
Windows Vista 64 bits
Cygwin - gcc 4.3.4
1.586207
Intel Xeon Quad-Core 2.4GHz
Ubuntu Server – Linux
Kernel 2.6 - gcc 4.5.2
0.769847
*ms = milliseconds
rections, resulting in a high rate of correct web 
attacks detection. Further, as the wavelet ap-
proach is based on low complexity calculus 
and it does not consider the training phase, an 
efficient and fast approach for detecting injec-
tion-based web attacks is obtained.
For future works, a new set of experiments 
to demonstrate the use feasibility in real time 
applications will be designed. The proposed 
approach so far has demonstrated good detec-
tion rates for web attacks in off-line scenarios.
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